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Abstract
We introduce the problem of stable manipulation where the manipulators need to compute if there
exist votes for the manipulators which make their preferred alternative win the election even if the ma-
nipulators’ knowledge about others’ votes are little inaccurate, that is, manipulation remains successful
even under small perturbation of the non-manipulators’ votes. We show that every scoring rule, max-
imin, Bucklin, and simplified Bucklin voting rules are stably manipulable in polynomial time for single
manipulator. In contrast, stable manipulation becomes intractable for the Copelandα voting rule for
every α ∈ [0, 1] even for single manipulator. Hence our results show that the well studied single manip-
ulation problem remains polynomial time solvable for scoring rules, maximin, Bucklin, and simplified
Bucklin voting rules even if the manipulator is not too sure about the votes of the non-manipulators.
However, a little uncertainty about non-manipulators’ votes makes manipulation by single voter in-
tractable for Copelandα voting rule for every α ∈ [0, 1]. However for a constant number of alternatives,
we show that the stable manipulation problem is polynomial time solvable for every anonymous and
efficient voting rules. Finally we empirically show that the probability that a uniformly random profile
is stably manipulable decreases drastically even if manipulator possess little uncertainty about others’
votes.
1 Introduction
Voting has served as a fundamental tool for aggregating preferences of a set of people over a set of
alternatives from centuries. A typical voting system consists of a set of alternatives, a set of voters each
having a linear order over the set of alternatives as her preference, and a voting rule which selects a set of
alternatives as winners depending on the voters’ preferences. However, classical results show that every
reasonable voting system with at least 3 alternatives can suffer from manipulation [Gib73, Sat75] — an
agent may be able to make her more favored alternative win by misreporting her preference. Bartholdi
et al. pioneered the idea of using computational intractability as a barrier to safe guard elections against
manipulation [BTT89, BO91]. Indeed, if we have m alternatives and even if the manipulator exactly
knows the preferences of all other voters, na¨ıvely going over all (m! − 1) possible preferences and
report the one which results in best outcome for the manipulator is not feasible for any computationally
bounded manipulator.
Although the idea of Bartholdi et al. was to use computational intractability as a barrier against
manipulation, the computational problem of manipulation turns out to be polynomial time solvable
for most of the commonly used voting rules such as the scoring rules, maximin, Copeland, etc. with
prominent exception being the single transferable (STV) voting rule. Even for voting rules (STV for
example) for which the computational barrier exists against manipulation, it seems that the barrier, in
reality, may be substantially weak due to existence of heuristics which work well in practice [FP10,
FKKN11, MR15, and references there in].
Motivation: The computational problem of manipulation has mostly been studied in what is called
the complete information setting — the manipulator exactly knows the preferences of all other voters.
Although, this setting may be the best possible to prove intractability results (if one proves that ma-
nipulation is intractable even if the manipulator exactly knows the preferences of all other voters, then
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manipulator’s job can only be harder if she does not know some part of others’ preferences), it is hardly
practical. Indeed, most applications of voting in AI, voting over a social network for example, involve
a large number of voters where the complete information setting is far from reality. This motivates us
to study the classical manipulation problem with an incomplete information setting. In our model, for
every voter v, the manipulator has a believed preference v and an integer δv denoting the worst case
Kendall-Tau (number of pairs which are ranked differently) distance by which the true preference of
the voter v can deviate; low (high respectively) value of δv corresponds to the manipulator having high
(low respectively) confidence on her belief about voter v’s true preference. Indeed, in many real world
election scenarios, the manipulator can form a belief about a voter’s preference based on that voter’s
historical data and other activities. However, due to various activities that may have happened since the
last election or simply because of the inherent uncertainty in human nature, the voter’s preference may
have changed to some extent (quantified as δv).
1.1 Contribution
In our basic problem, called STABLE MANIPULATION, the input is a setA ofm alternatives, a set V of n vot-
ers associated with each of them a believed preference, a distinguished alternative c, and a number ` of
manipulators. We need to compute if there exists a preference profile for the manipulators which makes
c win the election irrespective of any deviation of every other voter v from her believed preference v by
at most δv under Kendall-Tau distance. We prove that the STABLE MANIPULATION problem is polynomial
time solvable for the k-approval voting rule for any number of manipulators [Theorem 3]. If we have
only manipulator (that is ` = 1), then the STABLE MANIPULATION problem is polynomial time solvable for
every scoring rule, maximin, Bucklin, and simplified Bucklin voting rules. On the other hand, we show
that the STABLE MANIPULATION problem is co− NP− hard for the Copelandα voting rule even with one
manipulator [Theorem 6]. We summarize our complexity theoretic results in Table 1. Other than that,
we show that, for a constant number of alternatives, the stable manipulation problem is polynomial time
solvable for every anonymous and efficient voting rule for any number of manipulators [Theorem 7]. Fi-
nally we empirically show that the probability that a random profile being stably manipulable drastically
decreases even if the manipulator’s uncertainty about others’ votes increases slightly for all the common
voting rules studied here.
Voting Rule STABLE MANIPULATION
k-approval
P for any number of
manipulators [Theorem 3]
Scoring rules
P for single manipulator
[Theorem 1]
maximin
P for single manipulator
[Theorem 2]
NP-hard for > 2manipulators
[Observation 1]
[Faliszewski et al. [FHS08, FHS10]]
Copelandα
co− NP−Hard even for
single manipulator [Theorem 6]
Bucklin
P for single manipulator
[Theorem 5]
Simplified Bucklin
P for single manipulator
[Theorem 4]
Table 1: Summary of results for STABLE MANIPULATION. Our algorithms work even for the case when
manipulators have different δ value for different voters. Our hardness work even when the manipulators
have the same δ value for every voter. Results in bold are proved in this paper.
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1.2 Related Work
Initiated by Bartholdi et al. the study of manipulation has been one of the key research focus in compu-
tational social choice [BTT89, BO91]. Conitzer et al. showed that, for weighted elections, the coalition
manipulation problem which is manipulation by a coalition of voters, is NP-complete even when we
have a small constant number of alternatives for most of the commonly used voting rules [CSL07]. Fal-
iszewski and Procaccia exhibited evidence that the computational problem of manipulation may not be
computationally challenging on average [FP10]. Mossel and Ra´cz and Friedgut et al. showed that, for a
uniformly random preference profile, reporting a random preference results in a successful manipulation
with high probability (1 over some polynomial in the number of voters and the number of alternatives)
for any reasonable voting rule [MR15, FKKN11]. We refer to [CW16] for an excellent overview of the
computational problem of manipulation. Manipulation comes under a more general class of problems
known as election control problems. Election control refers to the phenomenon of influencing the out-
come of an election through various means. Other than manipulation, prominent examples of election
control problems include bribery, voter deletion, alternative deletion, voter partition, alternative parti-
tion, etc. We refer to [FR16] for a comprehensive survey of various kind of election control problems
studied in computational social choice.
Limiting manipulators’ access to other voters’ preference profile has been studied before. Conitzer et
al. defined the dominating manipulation problem in a bid to model manipulator’s limited information
and showed that the commonly used voting rules, except plurality and veto, are resistant to this kind
of manipulation [CWX11]. Dey et al. captured the manipulator’s approach to risk into the concept
of weak, strong, and opportunistic manipulation and showed that the weak as well as opportunistic
manipulations are intractable for all commonly used voting rules except plurality and veto whereas the
strong manipulation admits a polynomial time algorithm for most of the common voting rules [DMN18].
Both the above papers model manipulator’s limited information as a partial preference profile (a partial
preference for each voter); for every other voter, the manipulator knows the ordering of some of the
pairs for sure but does not have any clue about the remaining pairs. On the other hand, our model of
manipulator’s limited information cannot be modelled as partial preferences over voters; in our model,
intuitively speaking, manipulator’s lack of information is distributed over all pairs of alternatives.
2 Preliminaries
Let us denote the set {1, 2, . . . ,n} by [n] for any positive integer n. Let A = {a1,a2, . . . ,am} be a set
of alternatives or alternatives and V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} a set of voters. If not mentioned otherwise, we
denote the number of alternatives by m and the number of voters by n. Every voter vi has a preference
or vote i which is a complete order over A. We denote the set of complete orders over A by L(A).
We call a tuple of n preferences (1,2, · · · ,n) ∈ L(A)n an n-voter preference profile. An election is
defined as a set of alternatives together with a voting profile. Let unionmulti denote the disjoint union of sets. A
map r : unionmultin,|A|∈N+L(A)n −→ 2A \{∅} is called a voting rule. A voting rule r is called efficient if the winners
under r can be computed in polynomial time. A voting rule is called anonymous if the set of winners
does not depend on the name of the voters. For a voting rule r and a preference profile = (1, . . . ,n),
we say a alternative x wins uniquely if r() = {x} and x co-wins if x ∈ r(). For a vote ∈ L(A) and two
alternatives x,y ∈ A, we say x is placed before y in  if x  y; otherwise we say x is placed after y in .
A alternative is said to be at the ith position from the top/left (bottom/right) if there are exactly (i− 1)
alternatives before (after) it. For any two alternatives x,y ∈ A with x 6= y in an election E = (A,P), let
us define the margin DP(x,y) of x from y to be |{i : x i y}| − |{i : y i x}|. Examples of some common
voting rules are as follows.
B Positional scoring rules: A collection (−→sm)m∈N+ of m-dimensional vectors −→sm =
(α1,α2, . . . ,αm) ∈ Nm with α1 > α2 > . . . > αm and α1 > αm for every m ∈ N+ naturally
defines a voting rule — a alternative gets score αi from a vote if it is placed at the ith position from
the bottom, and the score of a alternative is the sum of the scores it receives from all the votes.
The winners are the alternatives with maximum score. If αi is 1 for i ∈ [k] and 0 otherwise, then
we get the k-approval voting rule. If αi = m− i, then we get the Borda rule
B Copelandα: Given α ∈ [0, 1], the Copelandα score of a alternative x is |{y 6= x : DP(x,y) >
3
0}| + α|{y 6= x : DP(x,y) = 0}|. The winners are the alternatives with maximum Copelandα score.
If not mentioned otherwise, we will assume α to be zero.
B Maximin: The maximin score of a alternative x in an election E is miny6=xDP(x,y). The winners
are the alternatives with maximum maximin score.
B Bucklin and simplified Bucklin: Let ` be the minimum integer such that there exists at least one
alternative x ∈ A whom more than half of the voters place in their top ` positions. Then the
Bucklin winners are the alternatives who are placed most number of times within top ` positions of
the votes. The simplified Bucklin winners are the alternatives who appear within the top ` positions
in a majority of the preferences.
B Single transferable vote (STV): In every iteration, the alternative with lowest plurality score
(breaking tie using some tie-breaking rule) drops out from the election. The alternative remaining
after m− 1 iterations is the winner.
The Kendall-Tau distance between a pair of preferences ,′∈ L(A), denoted by dKT (,′), is the
number of pairs of alternatives where  and ′ differ; that is dKT (,′) = {(a,b) ∈ A×A : a 6= b,a 
b,b ′ b}. Alternatively, the Kendall-Tau distance is the number of adjacent swaps needed to convert a
preference into another. In this draft, by swaps, we mean only adjacent swaps.
2.1 Problem Definition
We now define our problem formally.
Definition 1 (STABLE MANIPULATION). Given a set A of m alternatives, an n-voter profile P = (i)i∈[n] ∈
L(A)n over A, a distinguished alternative c ∈ A, a tuple (δi)i∈[n] of non-negative integers, and the number
` (a positive integer) of manipulators, compute if there exists a profile (′n+1, . . . ,′n+`) ∈ L(A)` such that,
we have c ∈ r((′i)i∈[n+`]) for every (′i)i∈[n] ∈ L(A)n with dKT (i,′i) 6 δi for every i ∈ [n]. We denote
an arbitrary instance of STABLE MANIPULATION by (A,P, c, (δi)i∈[n], `).
The above definition of STABLE MANIPULATION requires c to be a co-winner. One can similarly pose
the problem in the unique winner setting. We remark that all our results, both algorithmic and hardness,
easily extend to the unique winner setting. For ease of exposition, we restrict ourselves to the co-winner
setting only in this short version. For the classical MANIPULATION problem, we have δi = 0 for every
i ∈ [n]. Hence, we have the following observation.
Observation 1. If MANIPULATION is NP-hard for a voting rule r with ` manipulators, then STABLE MANIP-
ULATION is also NP-hard for r with ` manipulators.
Proposition 1. (i) The STABLE MANIPULATION problem is NP-complete for the maximin and
Copelandα,α ∈ [0, 12 ) ∪ ( 12 , 1], voting rules even for 2 manipulators.
3 Results
We present our theoretical results in this section. We begin with presenting our algorithm for the scoring
rules.
Theorem 1. There is a polynomial time algorithm for the STABLE MANIPULATION problem for every scoring
rule if we have only one manipulator.
Proof. Let α = (αi)i∈[m] be an arbitrary scoring rule and (A,P, c, (δi)i∈[n], ` = 1) an arbitrary instance of
STABLE MANIPULATION for α. We iteratively try construct a manipulator’s preference M which results
in a stable manipulation. Without loss of generality, we place the alternative c at the first position of
M in the first iteration. Iteratively, suppose we have already placed alternatives at every position in
{1, . . . , t− 1} for some 2 6 t 6 m and we next wish to place an alternative at the t-th position. Let At−1
be the set of alternatives which are placed within first t − 1 positions; we obviously have c ∈ At−1. We
now check if there exists an alternative a ∈ A \ At−1 which can be placed at the i-th position “safely”,
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then we place the alternative a at the i-th position and go to next iteration; otherwise we output that the
instance is a NO instance. We say that the position t is “safe” for an alternative a ∈ A\At−1 if there does
not exist any n-voter profile Q such that (i) the Kendall-Tau distance between the j-th preferences of P
and Q is at most δj for every j ∈ [n] and (ii) the score of the alternative a is more than the score of the
alternative c in the profile (Q,M) where M is any preference which places the alternatives c and a at
positions 1 and t respectively. We next describe how to check, in polynomial time, whether a position
t ∈ {2, . . . ,m} is safe for an alternative a.
Before proceeding further, let us define some notation. For a preference ∈ L(A) and an alternative
a ∈ A, let rank(,a) be the position of the alternative a in the preference order . We define RS(,a,k)
to be the preference ′ obtained by shifting the alternative a to the right by min(k,m − rank(,a))
positions. Similarly, we define LS(,a,k) to be the preference′ obtained by shifting the alternative a to
the left by min(k, rank(,a)−1) positions. We use S(,a) and S(R,a) to denote the score of alternative a
in a preference and a preference profileR respectively. From the given preference profile P = (i)i∈[n],
we construct another preference profile Qa = (′i)i∈[n] as follows. For every i ∈ [n], let ji ∈ {0, 1, . . . , δi}
be the integer by which degrading the position of the alternative c and followed by improving the position
of the alternative a in i is worst possible for c with respect to a in i. Formally, for j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , δi}, let
∆(i, c, j,a, δi−j) be the decrease of the score of the alternative c plus the increase in the score of a if we
degrade the position of c in the preference i by j and then we improve the position of a by δi− j; that is
∆(i, c, j,a, δi− j) = S(i, c)−S(LS(RS(i, c, j),a, δi− j), c)+S(LS(RS(i, c, j),a, δi− j),a)−S(i,a).
Then we have ji ∈ arg maxj∈{0,1,...,δi} ∆(i, c, j,a, δi − j). We define ′i= LS(RS(i, c, ji),a, δi − ji). For
an alternative a ∈ A \ At−1 and position t, we say that the position t (in the manipulator’s vote) is safe
for the alternative a if S(Qa, c) + α1 > S(Qa,a) + αt. This concludes the description of our algorithm.
Clearly our algorithm runs in polynomial time. We next prove its correctness.
Suppose the algorithm outputs that the input instance is a YES instance. Then we claim that the
manipulator’s preference M is a successful stable manipulation. Suppose not, then there exist an
alternative a ∈ A \ {c} and an n-voters preference profile Ra such that (i) the Kendall-Tau distance
between the j-th preferences of P and Ra is at most δj for every j ∈ [n] and (ii) the score of the
alternative a is more than the score of the alternative c in the profile (Ra,M). Suppose the position
of the alternative a in M be ja ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. Then, from the design of the algorithm it follows that
S(Qa, c) + α1 > S(Qa,a) + αt where Qa is the profile considered by the algorithm in the ja-th iteration
(when the alternative a was placed at the ja-th position) for checking safety of a at position ja. From
the construction of Qa, it follows that S(Qa,a) − S(Qa, c) > S(Ra,a) − S(Ra, c) and thus we have the
following
S(Ra,a) − S(Ra, c) 6 S(Qa,a) − S(Qa, c) 6 α1 − αt
which implies that S(Ra, c) + α1 > S(Ra,a) + αt. However, this contradicts our assumption that the
score of the alternative a is more than the score of the alternative c in the profile (Ra,M). Hence
the instance was indeed a YES instance. Now suppose the algorithm outputs that the input instance is
a NO instance. Then, there exists an integer t ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that the algorithm does not find any
alternative in the t-th iteration to be placed at position t safely. We observe that, if a position k is unsafe
for an alternative x ∈ A \ {c}, then the position k − 1 is also unsafe for x. Then we have m − t + 1
alternatives, namely the alternatives in the set A \ At−1, who must appear within the rightmost m − t
positions of any manipulator’s preference ′M if ′M results in a successful stable manipulation which is,
by pigeon holing principle, impossible. Hence the input instance was indeed a NO instance and thus the
algorithm is correct.
We next present our polynomial time algorithm for the STABLE MANIPULATION problem for the max-
imin voting rule if we have only one manipulator.
Theorem 2. There exists a polynomial time algorithm for the STABLE MANIPULATION problem for the
maximin voting rule if we have only one manipulator.
Proof. Let (A,P, c, (δi)i∈[n], ` = 1) be an arbitrary instance of STABLE MANIPULATION for the maximin
voting rule. On a high level, our algorithm for the maximin voting rule is similar to our algorithm for
scoring rules: we put c at the first position of the manipulator’s vote in the first iteration, and then
iteratively, in the t-th iteration, if At−1 is the set of alternatives within the first t − 1 positions, we place
an alternative a ∈ A\At−1 if it is safe; that is, given the partial preference of the manipulator constructed
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so far, placing the alternative a at the t-th position does not make the maximin score of a become more
than the maximin score of the alternative c for any n-voters preference profile Q where the Kendall Tau
distance between the i-th preferences of P and Q is not more than δi. The only thing that changes here
from the algorithm in Theorem 1 is the algorithm for checking safety which we explain below.
We begin with assuming that the given alternative a cannot be placed safely at t-th position given the
alternatives at the first t−1 positions; that is there exists an n-voters preference profile Q with properties
stated above. We first guess an alternative b ∈ A \ {c} (the alternative b can be the alternative a itself)
such that the maximin score of c in Q is DQ(c,b). From the given preference profile P = (i)i∈[n], we
construct another preference profile Qab = (′i)i∈[n] so that (i) the Kendall Tau distance between the i-th
preferences of P and Qab is not more than δi, and (ii) the difference between the maximin score of a and
c is the maximum possible (the maximin score of a being higher). For an i ∈ [n], the preference i can
be one of the following types:
Case I – it is possible to place the alternative c on the right of the alternative b by swapping at most
δi pairs of alternatives: Let ji is the minimum number of swaps needed in i to place the alternative
c on the right of the alternative b; ji is 0 if c already appears on the right of b. Then we define
′i= LS(RS(i, c, ji),a, δi − ji); that is, we first shift c right to place it immediately after b and then
shift a left as much as we can.
Case II – it is not possible to place the alternative c on the right of the alternative b by swapping at most
δi pairs of alternatives: We define ′i= LS(i,a, δi); that is, we shift a left as much as we can.
This finishes the description of the preference profile Qab. Let ′M be any arbitrary completion of the
partially constructed preference of the manipulator. We declare the alternative a to be safe at the t-th
iteration if, for every alternative b ∈ A\ {c}, the alternative c co-wins in the preference profile (Qab,′M).
This concludes the description of our algorithm. Clearly our algorithm runs in polynomial time. We next
prove its correctness.
Suppose the algorithm outputs that the input instance is a YES instance. Then we claim that the
manipulator’s preference M is a successful stable manipulation. Suppose not, then there exist an
alternative a ∈ A \ {c} and an n-voters preference profile Ra such that (i) the Kendall-Tau distance
between the j-th preferences of P and Ra is at most δj for every j ∈ [n] and (ii) the score of the
alternative a is more than the score of the alternative c in the profile (Ra,M). Suppose the position of
the alternative a in M be ja ∈ {2, . . . ,m} and b ∈ A \ {c} be an alternative such that the maximin score
of the alternative c is D(Ra,M)(c,b). Then, from the design of the algorithm it follows that the maximin
score of a is more than the maximin score of c in the preference profile (Qab,M). This contradicts
our assumption that the algorithm declared that placing the alternative a at the ja-th position in the
ja-th iteration was safe (since the algorithm has placed the alternative a at the ja-th position in the
ja-th iteration). Hence, the input instance is indeed a YES instance. Now suppose the algorithm outputs
that the input instance is a NO instance. Then, there exists an integer t ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that the
algorithm finds that it is unsafe for every alternative a ∈ A \ At−1 to appear before every alternative
in A \ (At−1 ∪ {a}). However, in every possible manipulators preference M, there exists an alternative
a ∈ A \ At−1 which appears before every alternative in A \ (At−1 ∪ {a}). Hence the input instance is
indeed a NO instance and thus the algorithm is correct.
For the k-approval voting rule, we are able to reduce the STABLE MANIPULATION problem with any
number of manipulators to an equivalent maximum flow problem thereby obtaining a polynomial time
algorithm.
Theorem 3. There exists a polynomial time algorithm for the STABLE MANIPULATION problem for the k-
approval voting rule for any number of manipulators and any k.
Proof. Let (A,P, c, (δi)i∈[n], `) be an arbitrary instance of STABLE MANIPULATION for the k-approval vot-
ing rule. We may assume without loss of generality that the alternative c is placed at the first position
in every preference of the manipulators. For every alternative a ∈ A \ {c}, we compute the maximum
number λa of manipulators’ preferences where the alternative a can appear within the first k positions
in any manipulators’ preference profile which results in successful stable manipulation. Each preference
i, i ∈ [n] belongs to exactly one of the following types: (i) simultaneously c can be placed outside of
the first k positions and a can be placed within the first k positions without changing order of more
than δi pairs of alternatives in i (ii) c can be placed outside of the first k positions without changing
order of more than δi pairs of alternatives and a can not be placed within the first k positions without
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changing order of more than δi pairs of alternatives in i (iii) c can not be placed outside of the first
k positions without changing order of more than δi pairs of alternatives and a can be placed within
the first k positions without changing order of more than δi pairs of alternatives in i (iv) either c can
be placed outside of the first k positions or a can be placed within the first k positions (but not both)
without changing order of more than δi pairs of alternatives in i (v) both c can not be placed outside of
the first k positions without changing order of more than δi pairs of alternatives and a can not be placed
within the first k positions without changing order of more than δi pairs of alternatives in i. Let the
number of such preferences respectively be n1,n2,n3,n4, and n5. Let S(P, x) be the k-approval score of
any alternative x ∈ A in the profile P. We define λa = (` + n3 + n5) − (n1 + n3) = ` + n5 − n1; that
is, loosely speaking, the worst profile for c with respect to the alternative a derived from P is to push c
outside first k, if possible, and then push a within first k, if possible. If, for any alternative a ∈ A \ {c},
we have λa < 0, then the algorithm outputs NO.
We now construct the following flow network G = (V,E, s, t, c : E −→ N>1).
V = {s, t} ∪ {ui : i ∈ [`]} ∪ {va|a ∈ A \ {c}}
E = {(s,ui) : i ∈ [`]}
∪ {(ui, va) : i ∈ [`],a ∈ A \ {c}}
∪ {(va, t) : a ∈ A \ {c}}
We now describe the capacities of the edges. The capacity of each outgoing edge from s is k− 1. For
a ∈ A \ {c}, the capacity of the edge (va, t) is λa. The capacity of every other edge is 1. The algorithm
outputs that the instance is a YES instance if and only if there is an s− t flow in G of value `(k− 1). This
finishes the description of the algorithm. We now prove its correctness.
Suppose the algorithm outputs that the instance is a YES instance. Then G has an s− t flow f of value
`(k − 1). We may assume without loss of generality that every edge carries an integral flow in f since
the capacity of every edge is some integer and f is a maximum flow. We now construct a preference
profile PM of ` manipulators. The manipulator i places an alternative a ∈ A \ {c} within first k positions
in PM if and only if the edge (ui, va) carries 1 unit of flow under f. Since every manipulator places c
at the first position of her preference, and the incoming flow at vertex ui, i ∈ [`] is k − 1 under f, we
have described which k alternatives appear within the first k position of each manipulator’s preference in
PM. We claim that the preference profile PM results in a successful stable manipulation. Indeed, for any
n-voters profile Q where the Kendall Tau distance between the i-th preferences of P and Q is at most δi,
we have S((Q,PM), c)−S(Q,a) > λa for every alternative a ∈ A\ {c}. Since every alternative a ∈ A\ {c}
appears within the first k positions at most λa times in PM, it follows that PM indeed results in successful
stable manipulation. On the other hand, if the algorithm outputs NO, then one of the following two cases
happen. In the first case there exists an alternative a ∈ A\ {c} such that λa < 0. Consider the preference
profile Qa obtained from P by simultaneously moving c outside first k positions in every preference of
type (i), (ii), and (iv) and a within first k positions in every preference of type (i) and (iii). We observe
that the k-approval score of a in Qa is more than the k-approval score of c from Qa plus ` and thus
the instance is indeed a NO instance. In the second case, suppose the algorithm outputs NO because the
maximum flow of G is strictly less than `(k − 1). In this case too, for any possible preference profile PM
of the manipulators, there exists an alternative a ∈ A \ {c} which appears within first k positions strictly
more than λa times. Then, in the profile (Qa,PM), the k-approval score of the alternative a is strictly
more than the k-approval score of the alternative c. Hence the instance is indeed a NO instance.
We next show our result for the simplified Bucklin rule.
Theorem 4. There exists a polynomial time algorithm for the STABLE MANIPULATION problem for the
simplified Bucklin voting rule if we have only one manipulator.
Proof. Let (A,P, c, (δi)i∈[n], ` = 1) be an arbitrary instance of STABLE MANIPULATION for the simplified
Bucklin voting rule. On a high level, our algorithm for the simplified Bucklin voting rule is similar to
our algorithm for scoring rules and the maximin voting rule. The only difference being, given a position
t ∈ {2, . . . ,m} and an alternative a ∈ A \ {c}, how do we decide if placing the alternative a at position
t in the manipulator’s vote is safe. We describe this below and skip repeating the other parts since they
are exactly similar to the algorithms for the scoring rules and the maximin voting rule.
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Let us denote by Sk(R,a) the k-approval score of alternative a in an n-voters profile R. We observe
that the alternative c wins in R under the simplified Bucklin rule if and only if, for every other alternative
a ∈ A \ {c} and for every k ∈ {1, 2, . . .m}, Sk(R,a) > n2 =⇒ Sk(R, c) > n2 . For any k let (i) n1
be the number of preference i∈ P where simultaneously c can be placed outside the first k positions
and a can be placed within the first k positions by swapping at most δi pairs of alternatives (call these
preference type (i)), (ii) n2 the number of preference i∈ P where either c can be placed outside the
first k positions or a can be placed within the first k positions by swapping at most δi pairs of alternatives
but not both can be done (call these preference type (ii)), (iii) n3 the the number of preference i∈ P
where c can be placed outside the first k positions and a can not be placed within the first k positions
by swapping at most δi pairs of alternatives (call these preference type (iii)), (iv) n4 the number of
preference i∈ P where c can not be placed outside the first k positions but a can be placed within the
first k positions by swapping at most δi pairs of alternatives (call these preference type (iv)), (v) n5 the
number of preference i∈ P where neither c can be placed outside the first k positions nor a can be
placed within the first k positions by swapping at most δi pairs of alternatives (call these preference type
(v)). We declare that position t in the manipulator’s preference is not safe for an alternative a ∈ A \ {c}
if there exists a position k ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that there exists an n-voters preference profile Q where
(i) the Kendall-Tau distance between the i-th preferences of P and Q is at most δi for every i ∈ [n]
and (ii) c appears within the first k positions in at most (dn2 e − 1) preferences in Q (observe that,
including manipulator, we have n + 1 voters in total) and a appears within the first k positions in at
least (dn2 e + 1) positions if k < t and dn2 e positions if k > t. This happens if and only if there exists
an integer ` ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,n2} (` corresponds to the number preferences of type (ii) which are modified to
put c outside the first k positions) such that we have n2 − ` + n4 + n5 6 dn2 e − 1 and, if k < t, then
n1 +n2 − `+n4 > dn2 e+ 1 and, if k > t, then n1 +n2 − `+n4 > dn2 e. This concludes the description of
our algorithm. Our algorithm clearly runs in polynomial time. We next argue its correctness. Suppose
that the algorithm outputs that the instance is a YES instance. Then we claim that the manipulator’s
preference M constructed by the algorithm results in a successful stable manipulation. Suppose not,
then there exists an n-voters preference profile Q such that (i) the Kendall-Tau distance between the i-th
preferences of P and Q is at most δi and (ii) c is not a simplified Bucklin winner in (Q,M), that is there
exists an alternative a ∈ A \ {c} and a position k ∈ [m] such that c does not appear within the first k
positions in a majority of the preferences whereas a appears within the first k positions in a majority
of preferences in (Q,M). Suppose the alternative a appears at the t-th position in M. Also let the
number of preferences of type (ii) where c is put outside the first k positions in Q be `. Then we consider
the profile Qa obtained from P where
B in preferences of type (i), simultaneously c is placed outside the first k positions and a is placed
within the first k positions in Qa.
B in ` number of preferences of type (ii) and all preference of type (iii), c is put outside the first k
positions in Qa. In n2 − ` number of preferences of type (ii) and all preference of type (iv), a is put
within the first k positions in Qa.
B all preferences of type (v) remain the same in P and Qa.
It follows that, since c does not get majority within the first k positions but a gets majority within the first
k positions in (Q,M), c does not get majority within the first k positions but a gets majority within the
first k positions in (Qa,M). This contradicts our assumption that the algorithm declared the position
t in the manipulator’s preference safe for the alternative a. Hence the input instance is indeed a YES
instance.
Now suppose that the algorithm outputs that the instance is a NO instance. For the sake of arriving to
a contradiction, let us assume that there exists a manipulator’s preference ′M∈ L(A) which results in
successful stable manipulation. Since our algorithm outputs NO, there exists an iteration t ∈ {2, . . . ,m}
such that, if At−1 is the set of alternatives already placed in the first t − 1 positions by the algorithm,
then every alternative a ∈ A\At−1 was judged unsafe for the position t in the manipulator’s preference.
In this case, there indeed exists an n-voters profile Qa ∈ L(A)n for every alternative a ∈ A \ At−1 such
that (i) the Kendall-Tau distance between the i-th preferences of P and Qa is at most δi and (ii) c appears
within the first k positions in at most (dn2 e − 1) preferences in Qa (observe that, including manipulator,
we have n+ 1 voters in total) and a appears within the first k positions in at least (dn2 e+ 1) positions if
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k < t and dn2 e positions if k > t . We observe that, if a position k is unsafe for an alternative x ∈ A \ {c},
then the position k−1 is also unsafe for x. Then we havem−t+1 alternatives, namely the alternatives in
the set A \At−1, who must appear within the rightmost m− t positions of any manipulator’s preference
′M if ′M results in a successful stable manipulation which is, by pigeon holing principle, impossible.
Hence the input instance was indeed a NO instance and thus the algorithm is correct.
The main idea of Theorem 4 can be extended to design a polynomial time algorithm for the Bucklin
voting rule.
Theorem 5. There exists a polynomial time algorithm for the STABLE MANIPULATION problem for the
Bucklin voting rule if we have only one manipulator.
Proof. Let (A,P, c, (δi)i∈[n], ` = 1) be an arbitrary instance of STABLE MANIPULATION for the Bucklin
voting rule. On a high level, our algorithm for the Bucklin voting rule is similar to our algorithms in
Theorem 1, 2 and 4. The only difference being, given a position t ∈ {2, . . . ,m} and an alternative
a ∈ A \ {c}, how do we decide if placing the alternative a at position t in the manipulator’s vote is safe.
We describe this below and skip repeating the other parts.
Let us denote by Sk(R,a) the k-approval score of alternative a in an n-voters profile R. We observe
that the alternative c wins in R under the Bucklin rule if and only if, for every other alternative a ∈ A\{c}
and for every k ∈ {1, 2, . . .m}, Sk(R,a) > n2 =⇒ Sk−1(R, c) > n2 or Sk(R, c) > Sk(R,a). Given a
preference ∈ L(A) and an alternative a ∈ A \ {c}, we define the following set X = {x1, x2, x3, x4} of
Boolean variables.
(i) We say that  satisfies x1 if and only if the alternative c does not appear within the first k positions
in .
(ii) We say that  satisfies x2 if and only if the alternative c does not appear within the first k − 1
positions in .
(iii) We say that  satisfies x3 if and only if the alternative a appears within the first k − 1 positions in
.
(iv) We say that  satisfies x4 if and only if the alternative a appears within the first k positions in .
We define the “type” T(,a) ⊆ X of the preference  with respect to an alternative a ∈ A \ {c} to
be the subset of X satisfied by the preference . Before we explain our algorithm for deciding whether
a position t is safe for an alternative a ∈ A \ {c}, we need to define few concepts and notation. Given a
preference ∈ L(A), an alternative a ∈ A \ {c}, and a distance δ, we define the “meta-type” M(,a, δ)
of  with respect to a and δ as the set of all types reachable from  within a Kendall-Tau distance of at
most δ; that is M(,a, δ) = {Z ⊆ X : ∃ ′∈ L(A),dKT (,′) 6 δ,T(′,a) = Z} ⊆ 2X. Let the set of all
possible meta-types be M = {Mi : i ∈ [ν]}. An important observation is that, since X has only 4 elements,
only 22
4
= 65536 (which is a constant) different meta-types are possible. For ease of exposition, let us
define γ = 16,ν = 65536. For an alternative a ∈ A \ {c}, let ni be the number of preferences in P of
meta-type Mi and λi the number of types in the meta-type Mi; that is Mi = {Ti,1, . . . , Ti,λi }. Another
important observation is that, given any preference ∈ L(A), a distance δ, and a type M ∈M, it can be
checked in polynomial time whether M ∈M(,a, δ); hence the set M ∈M(,a, δ) can be computed in
polynomial time.
We now describe our algorithm for whether a is safe at position t. For every k ∈ [m], we check the
following. For a tuple τ = (τi)i∈[ν] where τi = (`j)j∈[λi] such that
∑λi
j=1 `j = ni, we define an n-voters
preference profile Qτ constructed by converting `j number of preferences of meta-typeMi to preferences
of type Ti,j. Clearly the Kendall-Tau distance between the i-th preferences of P and Qτ is at most δi.
We declare position t to be safe for the alternative a if and only if, for every k ∈ [m] and every possible
corresponding τ, if k′ is the minimum integer such that c gets majority within the first k′ positions, then
a does not get majority within the first k′ − 1 positions, and the number of preferences where a appears
within the first k′ positions is at most the number of preferences where c appears within the first k′
positions in (Qτ,M) where M is any manipulator’s preference where c and a are placed respectively
at positions 1 and t. This concludes the description of our algorithm. Our algorithm runs in polynomial
time since there are O(nγνpoly(m)) possible tuples τ. We next argue its correctness.
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Suppose that the algorithm outputs that the instance is a YES instance. Then we claim that the
manipulator’s preference M constructed by the algorithm results in a successful stable manipulation.
Suppose not, then there exists an n-voters preference profile Q such that (i) the Kendall-Tau distance
between the i-th preferences of P and Q is at most δi and (ii) c is not a Bucklin winner in (Q,M),
that is there exists an alternative a ∈ A at some position t in M and a position k such that (i) if
k < t, then Sk(Q,a) > dn2 e + 1,Sk−1(Q, c) 6 dn2 e − 1, and Sk(Q,a) > Sk(Q, c), and (ii) if k > t, then
Sk(Q,a) > dn2 e+ 1,Sk−1(Q, c) 6 dn2 e− 1, and Sk(Q,a) > Sk(Q, c). Let us consider the set X of Boolean
variables with respect to the position k and the alternative a. Suppose the alternative a appears at the
t-th position in M. Let us define a tuple τ = (τi)i∈[ν] where τi = (`j)j∈[λi] such that `j is the number
of preferences of meta-type Mi that are converted into a preferences of type Ti,j in Q. Then it follows
that (i) if k < t, then Sk(Qτ,a) > dn2 e + 1,Sk−1(Qτ, c) 6 dn2 e − 1, and Sk(Qτ,a) > Sk(Qτ, c), and (ii) if
k > t, then Sk(Qτ,a) > dn2 e,Sk−1(Qτ, c) 6 dn2 e−1, and Sk(Qτ,a) > Sk(Qτ, c) which contradicts the fact
that the algorithm declared the position t in the manipulator’s preference to be safe for the alternative
a. Hence the instance is indeed a YES instance.
Now suppose that the algorithm outputs that the instance is a NO instance. For the sake of arriving to
a contradiction, let us assume that there exists a manipulator’s preference ′M∈ L(A) which results in
successful stable manipulation. Since our algorithm outputs NO, there exists an iteration t ∈ {2, . . . ,m}
such that, if At−1 is the set of alternatives already placed in the first t − 1 positions by the algorithm,
then every alternative a ∈ A\At−1 was judged unsafe for the position t in the manipulator’s preference.
In this case, there indeed exists an n-voters profile Qa ∈ L(A)n for every alternative a ∈ A \ At−1
such that (i) the Kendall-Tau distance between the i-th preferences of P and Qa is at most δi and (ii)
there exists some position k such that (a) if k < t, then Sk(Qa,a) > dn2 e + 1,Sk−1(Qa, c) 6 dn2 e − 1,
and Sk(Qa,a) > Sk(Qa, c), and (b) if k > t, then Sk(Qa,a) > dn2 e + 1,Sk−1(Qa, c) 6 dn2 e − 1, and
Sk(Q
a,a) > Sk(Qa, c). We observe that, if a position k is unsafe for an alternative x ∈ A \ {c}, then the
position k − 1 is also unsafe for x. Then we have m − t + 1 alternatives, namely the alternatives in the
set A\At−1, who must appear within the rightmostm− t positions of any manipulator’s preference ′M
if ′M results in a successful stable manipulation which is, by pigeon holing principle, impossible. Hence
the input instance was indeed a NO instance and thus the algorithm is correct.
Due to Theorem 1, 2, 4 and 5, one may suspect that there may exists a generic algorithm for the
STABLE MANIPULATION problem with one manipulator which works for the class responsive and monotone
voting rules that Bartholdi et al. defined [BTT89]. Our next result refutes such possibility as we show
that the STABLE MANIPULATION problem is co− NP− hard for the Copelandα voting rule for every α ∈
[0, 1] which is a responsive and monotone voting rule. We reduce from the X3C problem which is the
complement of the classical NP-complete problem X3C. We use the following lemma in our proof of
Theorem 6. The X3C and X3C are defined as follows.
Definition 2 (X3C and X3C). Given an universe U of 3n elements and a collection S of m subsets of U
each containing 3 elements, compute if there exists a sub-collection W ⊆ S such that (i) |W| = n and (ii)
∪S∈WS = U. An instance (U, S) of X3C is called a YES instance if there indeed exists such a W; otherwise
it is called a NO instance. The X3C is the complement problem of X3C: an instance (U, S) of X3C is a YES
instance if and only if (U, S) is a NO instance of X3C.
Since X3C is NP-complete, it follows that X3C is co− NP− hard.
Lemma 1. Let A = B ∪ Γ be a set of alternatives, and (Z(a,b)),a,b ∈ B,a 6= b be integers, all with same
parity, satisfying Z(b,a) = −Z(a,b) ∀a,b ∈ B. Let δ > 0, a positive integer, be given. Further, suppose
that |Γ | > 10δ`
∑
a,b∈B,a6=b |Z(a,b)|. Then there exists a preference profile P = (i)i∈[|P|] on the set of
alternatives A satisfying
1. DP(a,b) = Z(a,b) ∀ a,b ∈ B,a 6= b
2. For any two alternatives a,b ∈ B,a 6= b and any preference ∈ P, |rank(,a) − rank(,b)| > δ.
3. For any two alternatives b ∈ B,d ∈ Γ D′P(b,d) > 0 for all profiles P′ = (′i)i∈[|P|] which satisfy
dKT (i,′i) 6 δ ∀ i ∈ [|P|].
4. The number of preferences in P is bounded by a polynomial function of
∑
a,b∈B,a6=b |Z(a,b)|, and P
can be constructed in time polynomial in m+
∑
a,b∈B,a6=b |Z(a,b)|
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Proof. Follows from the proof of Lemma 13 in [Dey19].
Theorem 6. The STABLE MANIPULATION problem is co− NP− hard for the Copelandα voting rule for every
α ∈ [0, 1] even if we have only one manipulator and δ = 3 for every preference.
Proof. We now prove co-NP hardness. We reduce from X3C. Let (U = {ui : i ∈ [3n]}, S = {Sj : j ∈ [m]}) be
an arbitrary instance of X3C. We consider the following instance (A,P = (P1,P2), c, (δi = 3)i∈[n], ` = 1)
of STABLE MANIPULATION.
A = B ∪Λ ∪ Γ where
B = {c, x, z} ∪ {yu : u ∈ U}, |Λ| = 100n, |Γ | = 10m3n3
P1 = {c  {yu : u ∈ S}  d1  d2  d3 
z  d4  d5  x  others
for some di ∈ Γ , i ∈ [5] : ∀S ∈ S}
While describing the preferences above, whenever we say ‘others’, the unspecified alternatives are
assumed to be arranged in such a way that, for every unspecified alternative a ∈ A \ Γ , there are at least
6 alternatives from Γ in the immediate 6 positions on both left and right of a. We also ensure that any
alternative in Γ appears within top 10mn positions at most once in P1 ∪ P2 whereas every alternative in
A\ Γ appears within top 10mn position in every preference in P1. This is possible because |Γ | = 10m3n3
and |A \ Γ | = 3n+ 3. We now add a preference profile P2 such that we have the following.
B DP(c,yu) = DP(x,yu) = 0 for every u ∈ U
B DP(z, c) = 0
B DP(yu, z) = 6m for every u ∈ U
B DP(z, x) = 2(m− n) − 2
In P, every alternative in Λ gets defeated by at least 13 |Λ| of the alternatives from Λ in pairwise
elections by a margin of 6m. Every alternative in {c, x} defeats every alternative in Λ in pairwise elections
by a margin of 6m. Every alternative in Λ defeats every alternative in {yu : u ∈ U} ∪ {z} in pairwise
elections by a margin of 6m. Every alternative in A\Γ defeats every alternative in Γ in pairwise elections
by a margin of 6m. Such a profile P2 (and thus P) exists due to Lemma 1 (applied as B = A \ Γ). We
now claim that the two instance s are equivalent.
In one direction, suppose the X3C instance is a YES instance. Then there does not exists an exact cover
W ⊆ S for U. We claim that the manipulator’s vote M= c  others  x results in a stable manipulation.
To see this, let Q be any n-voters profile such that the Kendall-Tau distance between the i-th preferences
of P and Q is at most 3. We first observe that, since every alternative in Λ ∪ {yu : u ∈ U} ∪ {z} gets
defeated by at least 13 |Λ| of the alternatives from Λ and, for every unspecified alternative a ∈ A\ Γ , there
are at least 6 alternatives from Γ in the immediate 6 positions on both left and right of a and δ = 3, no
alternative in A \ {c, x} wins in Q. Let us define W to be the set of S ∈ S such that in the corresponding
preference in Q, c does not appear at the first position. If |W| > n3 , the the alternative z defeats x in
(Q,M) and consequently c is a winner in (Q,M). On the other hand, if |W| = n3 , then W is not an
exact set cover for U, there exists an element u ∈ U such that c defeats the alternative yu in (Q,M)
and thus c is a winner in (Q,M).
For the other direction, suppose the X3C instance is a NO instance. Let W ⊂ S forms an exact set
cover for U. Let us consider the n-voters preference profile obtained from P as: for every S ∈ W, in the
corresponding preference, we shift c to right by 3 positions; for every S ∈ S \ W, in the corresponding
preference, we shift x to left by 3 positions. It follows that, irrespective of the manipulator’s preference
M∈ L(A), every alternative in {yu : u ∈ U} defeats c and x defeats z. Hence x defeats 1 more alternative
than c and thus the STABLE MANIPULATION instance is a NO instance.
We now present a general result: STABLE MANIPULATION is polynomial time solvable for any polyno-
mial time computable anonymous voting rule if the number of alternatives is O(1).
Theorem 7. The STABLE MANIPULATION problem is poly-time solvable for any poly-time computable anony-
mous voting rule if the number of alternatives is O(1).
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Proof. Let (A,P = (i)i∈[n], c, (δi)i∈[n], `) be an arbitrary instance of STABLE MANIPULATION. Since
the voting rule is anonymous, any preference profile can equivalently be described by the number n of
times a preference∈ L(A) appears in the profile. Hence the number of different anonymous preference
profiles is
(
n+m!−1
m!−1
)
= O((n + m! − 1)m!−1) = O(nO(1)). We check, for every possible manipulators’
anonymous preference profile M (there are only
(
`+m!−1
m!−1
)
= O((` + m! − 1)m!−1) = O(`O(1)) such
preference profiles), if there exists an n-voters anonymous preference profile Q (by iterating over all
possible anonymous preference profiles) where (i) c does not win in (Q,M) and (ii) the input preference
profile P can be modified into the anonymous preference profile Q. We reduce the problem in the second
condition into a maximum flow problem as follows. In the bipartite graph G = (V,E, s, t, c : E −→ N>1)
with
V = V1 ∪ V2, where
V1 = {u1,u2, . . . ,un}
V2 = {v :∈ L(A)}
E = {(ui, v) : i ∈ [n],∈ L(A),dKT (i,) 6 δi}
∪ {(s,ui) : i ∈ [n]} ∪ {(v, t) :∈ L(A)}
The capacity of every edge from V1 to V2 and from s to V1 is 1. If a preference ∈ L(A) appears in Q
n number of times, we define the capacity of the edge (v, t) to be n. It follows that Q satisfies the
second condition if and only if there is a flow of value n in the above flow network.
4 Experiments
We now empirically study the effect of manipulator’s uncertainty about other voters’ preferences on the
number of stably manipulable profiles. To study this, we generate 100 uniformly random preference
profiles for various values of n (the number of voters), m (the number of alternatives), and δ (the
Kendall-Tau distance that each vote can change) and for many common voting rules, namely plurality,
Borda, Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, and single transferable vote (STV). We use our polynomial time
algorithms for the plurality, Borda, and maximin voting rules whereas we use our algorithm in Theorem 7
for other voting rules. We present some of our findings in Figures 3 and 6 deferring all findings to the
full version.
Figure 1: Results for m = 4, n = 4 Figure 2: Results for m = 5, n = 4
We observe that the probability that a uniformly random preference profile is stably manipulable is
almost 0 even if δ = 2 for all the above voting rules. We also observe that for the plurality voting rule,
this probability is almost 0 even if δ = 1. The intuitive reason for this is that, with δ = 1, the favorite
alternative c of the manipulator can always be pushed out of the first position in every other vote which
foils manipulation. Among voting rules other than plurality, we see that this probability falls most sharply
for the STV rule.
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Figure 3: Results for m = 6, n = 4 Figure 4: Results for m = 7, n = 4
Figure 5: Results for m = 10, n = 30 Figure 6: Results for m = 20, n = 30
Figure 7: Results for m = 30, n = 30
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5 Conclusion
We have proposed a new model, called stable manipulation, of incorporating manipulator’s uncertainty
about others’ preferences. Intuitively, in our model, unlike existing models in literature, the manipu-
lator’s uncertainty is distributed over the whole preference of other voters. We show that the stable
manipulation problem usually admits polynomial time algorithm for single manipulator with a promi-
nent exception of Copelandα for α ∈ [0, 1]. We finally show, through simulation, that the probability
of a random profile being stably manipulable drops drastically with slight increase of manipulator’s un-
certainty. Hence restricting information of any voter about the preferences of the others seems quite
effective in hindering manipulation.
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